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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to place their funds at higher interest rates on the Stock Exchange.
Now they carry their process of pauperization a step further, by
making money more easily available when their customers wish to
purchase speculative securities. The question will be asked: How
can the state prevent such transactions? Frankly, to us it seems pos-
sible only by legislation. And we claim that this legislation now exists.
We must adopt one of two attitudes: (a) Are we going to encourage
stock speculation, or (b) are we going to encourage legitimate busi-
ness transactions? The court seems to have spoken. The restraint of
the statute has been ruled out, and now by judicial legislation a situ-
ation has been brought about which, in view particularly of the
present financial depression, is economically unsound.
We cannot close our eyes to the unique position which banks
occupy in society. That the Legislature never intended to allow banks
to deal with other people's moneys as they (the banks) saw fit has
hitherto been unquestioned.2 0 All the statutes dealing with the banks
and banking powers stand in formidable array as authority.
To us it seems that courts should be more wary of throwing
overboard the safeguards which sound conservative economics and
policies have placed on the statute books, in favor of the radical
practices of the school of "new economics" that flamed so brightly
during the hectic days of our "bull market." but are visible now,
if at all, by a subdued blush.
SIDNEY E. COHN.
LIABILITIES OF TRUSTEES FOR BONDHOLDERS IN EXCESS OF
THEIR EXPRESS UNDERTAKINGS.
The instrument which creates an express trust specifies the
powers of the trustee and in the main furnishes the measure of his
obligations.' A trust deed or trust mortgage is such an instrument.
2
The trustee, with regard both to his powers and duties, is required to
act with the utmost good faith and diligence in protecting the interests
of both obligor and the bondholders.3 He may not transcend the
' As an indication that conservative banks regard this practice with appre-
hension, see the circular published by the Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Company, New York, under the title, "No Securities For Sale."
'3 Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence (3rd ed.), secs. 1062, 1079, 1080; 39 Cyc.
290-294; Ainsa v. Mercantile Trust Co., 174 Cal. 504, 163 Pac. Rep. 898 (1917).
See, however, Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 512, 65
N. E. 499 (1902), where the Court finds an implied duty arising from the
relationship alone.
' Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A., 3rd. 1918).
' Davenport v. Vaughn, 193 N. C. 646, 137 S. E. 714 (1927); Goode v.
Comfort, 39 Mo. 313 (1866) ; Sherwood v. Saxton, 63 Mo. 79 (1876) ; Central
Trust Co. v. Owsley, 188 Ill. App. 505 (1914) ; Merchants Loan Co. v. Trust
Co., 250 Ill. 86, 95 N. E. 59 (1911).
NOTES AND COMMENT
powers expressed in the trust indenture for that is an obvious breach
of trust.4 In this discussion, however, we are concerned not with the
trustee's powers but rather with his duties to the bondholders in the
care and maintenance of the security and with the limits which
exculpatory provisions in the trust indenture may place upon the
trustee's liabilities. a
A duty common to all such trustees is the certification of the
bonds issued by them. The certification is usually in some such form
as this: "This bond is one of a series of bonds mentioned and
described in the mortgage within referred to." This statement appears
upon the bond over the signature of the trustee and is usually by an
express provision in the bond made the sine qua non to its validity.
The question naturally arises: What force and effect has such a
certification? The question arises most frequently when the plaintiff
seeks to enforce an alleged liability against the certifying trustee.5
Tschetinian v. City Trust Company 6 and McCauley v. Ridgewood 7
were cases in which it was attempted to hold the trustees liable as
for a false and negligent representation by reason of the endorsement
upon the bonds by the mortgagor that they were first mortgage bonds
when in fact they were not. The defendants had merely certified each
of the bonds as being one of a series. The court in each case held
that the certification merely identified the bonds as genuine and was
not intended to guarantee their validity or the sufficiency of the
security. Other cases cited hold to the same effect." Professor Jones,
in his Corporate Bonds and Mortgages, has said: "The limited and
guarded terms of a trustee's certificate cannot be held to embrace a
representation or guaranty of the truthfulness of the description of
'1 Perry, Trusts (8th ed.), sec. 460; Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co.,
88 N. J. Eq. 450, 102 Atl. 844 (1917), aff'd 89 N. J. Eq. 584, 106 AtI. 890(1918). Birrell, Duties and Liabilities of Trustees, 28 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
Law 1063 (1896) : "Trustees are bound to observe the limits placed upon their
powers either by law or by the trust instrument, and if they transcend such
powers and cause damage to the estate they will be held responsible therefor
although they may have acted in perfect good faith."
ITschetinian v. City Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 432, 79 N. E. 401 (1906) ; Green
v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 223 App. Div. 12, 227 N. Y. Supp. 252 (1928),
aff'd 248 N. Y. 627, 162 N. E. 552 (1928) ; Bauernschmidt v. Maryland Trust
Co., 89 Md. 507, 43 Atl. 790 (1899) ; Ainsa v. Mercantile Trust Co., 174 Cal.
504, 163 Pac. 898 (1917); McCauley v. Ridgewood Trust Co., 81 N. J. L. 86,
79 Atl. 327 (1911) ; Byers v. Union Trust Co., 175 Pa. 318, 24 Atl. 629 (1896) ;
Bell v. Title Trust & Guaranty Co., 292 Pa. 228, 140 AtI. 900 (1928) ; Mullen
v. Eastern Trust Co., 108 Me. 498, 81 AtI. 948 (1911).
'Supra Note 5.
" Supra Note 5.
'In Bell v. Title Trust & Guaranty Co., 292 Pa. 228, 140 Atl. 900 (1928) the
Court says, "The error is in assuming that the brief recital in form of a certifi-
cate on the bonds by the Title Trust & Guaranty Co. over the signature of its
secretary was in fact a certification and guaranty of the validity of the bonds
and which therefore rendered the trustee liable for his loss. A certificate of
this character carries with it no such burden and creates no such obligation. It
is merely a bare declaration that the bonds in this dispute were of the issue of
bonds by the Savage Fire Brick Company.
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the obligation as made by the obligor. Trustees act for a compara-
tively trifling consideration, limiting their ability to their own acts
of negligence and misconduct and it would be unfair to put so serious
a burden as a guaranty upon them." 9
Where, however, the gravamen of the charge is some negligent
act on the part of the trustee in certifying the bonds, he will be held
liable. Thus, trustees have been held liable for certifying bonds upon
securities differing from those called for by the trust indenture, 10
for certifying bonds without calling for and receiving a statement of
the purposes for which the bonds were to be appropriated," for
issuing bonds upon insufficient security 12 and for certifying more
bonds than were called for by the trust agreement.13 In each case the
trustee's abuse of the powers conferred upon him rendered him liable
to the party injured for the damage done and he was not allowed to
plead a contract for immunity from liability as a defense.
It is generally conceded that the parties creating a trust may
agree to limit the liability of the trustee for negligent acts or omis-
sions.' 4 This right to contract is not unlimited, however, for a total
immunity from liability for one's faults is repugnant to the law. So
that it has been held that an exculpatory provision in a trust inden-
ture cannot protect one from liability for gross negligence or bad
faith.15 Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co.16 establishes another limi
tation, viz.: That an exculpatory clause can never exempt a trustee
from liability for transcending or abusing his powers, as distinguished
from abusing his discretion in the exercise of powers actually con-
ferred. But the distinction escapes us. A casual inspection of the
provisions of modern trust mortgages will reveal the fact that the
intention is to limit the liability of the trustee to the minimum per-
mitted by the law. In some of these, nearly every grant of power is
qualified by a clause relieving the trustee from liability for its abuse.
We cannot see how the learned Court can deduce any intent to save
the trustee harmless only for errors of judgment and not for exceed-
ing his power. We think, rather, that if there is any such limitation
upon the power of a trustee to contract for immunity, it is because
such a contract is repugnant to the law and contrary to public policy.
And it may be that the sole effect of the decisions in Conover v.
'Jones, Corporate Bonds and Mortgages (3rd ed., 1907), sec. 287a.
"Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 450, 102 Atl. 844 (1917),
aff'd 89 N. J. Eq. 584, 106 Ati. 890 (1918) ; Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat.
Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930).
"X Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 512, 65 N. E.
499 (1902).
" Hunsberger v. Guaranty Trust Co.. 164 App. Div. 740, 150 N. Y. Supp.
190 (1st Dept., 1914), aff'd 218 N. Y. 742, 113 N. E. 1058 (1916).
"Mullen v. Eastern Trust Co., 108 Me. 498, 81 Atl. 948 (1911).
' Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617 (1883); Browning v. Fidelity Trust
Co., supra Note 2.
"Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., supra Note 2; Benton v. Safe Denosit
Bank. 134 Misc. 727. 236 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1926) ; Harvey v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 134 Misc. 417, 236 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1929).
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Guaranty Trust 10 and Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank 17 is
to supply a further definition of gross negligence.' 8
Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank 19 was a case in which a
trustee was held liable for its negligence in unauthorizedly authenti-
cating an issue of bonds. The trust indenture provided that the bonds
were to be authenticated by the trustee when the proper collateral was
delivered and pledged with it, viz.:
"B. Trade acceptances or notes of dealers * * * or note
of purchasers in part payment for motor vehicles * * "
The trustee was given the power to demand of the obligor corpora-
tion the names and addresses of the makers of the notes and other
pertinent data concerning them. The defendant made no such demand
but certified the bonds without investigating the identities of the
makers of the notes delivered to it. They were not made by dealers
or purchasers and proved to be worthless. The plaintiff, a purchaser
of some of the bonds certified by the defendant, sued, charging it
with negligence. The trust indenture contained a provision exempting
the defendant from liability for its acts and omissions to act. Says
the Court (quoting from Conover v. Guaranty Trust Co.) : 20
"It accordingly seems impossible to construe an immunity
clause as intended to exempt a trustee from liability for
transcending his powers as clearly defined by the trust agree-
ment; his engagement is to exercise the powers and only the
powers conferred upon him and the appropriate office and
purpose of an immunity clause forming a part of a trust
agreement which specifically and clearly defines the trustee's
powers appears to be to limit his responsibility in matters of
judgment and discretion committed to him in the execution of
those defined powers."
If such is the rule of liability for the negligent acts of the trustee,
what is the rule in cases of omission to act? In Green v. Title Guar-
10Supra Note 10.
'Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, supra Note 10.
'Gross negligence has been defined as "the intentional failure to perform
a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life
or property of another." McDonald v. The Railway Co. (Tex. Civ. App.),
21 S. W. 775 (1893), and Schindler v. Railway Co., 87 Mich. 400, 49 N. W.
670 (1891) ; also as "such a gross want of care and regard for the rights of
others as to justify the presumption of wilfulness or wantonness." 2 Thomp-
son, Negligence. 1264. For a thoughtful analysis of the whole problem and a
collection of all the cases, see Posner, Liabilities of the Corporate Trustee,
(1928) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 198.
"Supra Note 10.
o Supra Note 10.
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antee and Trust Co.21 the trustee failed to demand from the mort-
gagor a further conveyance which would have cured a defective
mortgage, and to re-file the chattel mortgage. While it was held that
the immunity paragraph. 22 was effective to absolve the defendant
from liability for not procuring the conveyance, it was stated by way
of dictum that the defendant could not have been absolved from
liability for not re-filing the mortgage. It may be that the first obliga-
tion involved the exercise of discretion and judgment, and that the
second was a duty to be performed independently of any exercise of
discretion, and the non-performance of such a duty, affecting as it
does the validity of the mortgagee's lien, constitutes gross negligence.
It is our opinion that the Title Guarantee & Trust Company was
grossly negligent in the exercise of its discretion. This case has been
severely criticized.23
In Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,24 which was
decided before Glanzer v. Shepard 25 and International v. Erie Rail-
road Co.,26 the relationship existing between the trustee and those
who at the time of the negligent act or omission are not yet bond-
holders, but who later acquire bonds, is referred to as a trust relation-
ship. It seems to have been taken for granted in all the decisions on
the subject 27 that future bondholders were cestuis que trustent. Mullen
v. Eastern Trust Co.28 is the only exception. There the liability was
represented to be a liability for deceit, a position which could not be
sustained in New York in the absence of evidence of intent to
defraud.2 9 In Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank 30 the Court of
Appeals for the first time raised the question: How can a trustee, in
incorrectly certifying bonds to prospective takers in order that they
may become cestui que trust, at that moment and before the relation-
ship is established, have violated a trust duty owed to them? It is at
this point that Glanzer v. Shepard 31 and International v. Erie Rail-
road 32 are called in to save the day. The liability is for negligence.
The plaintiff, relying upon the negligent representation of the defen-
dant, invested his money upon the faith of its certificate. Here was a
a'223 App. Div. 12, 227 N. Y. Supp. 252 (lst Dept., 1928), aff'd 248 N. Y.
627, 162 N. E. 552 (1928).
22 "* * * the trustee is under no obligation to record or file this indenture
in any office whatsoever or to procure any additional instrument or further
assurance or to do any act for the continuance or conservation of the lien hereof
or for giving notice of the existence of such lien."(1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 829.
172 N. Y. 512, 65 N. E. 499 (1902).
-233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275, 23 A. L. R. 1425 (1922).
244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662, 56 A. L. R. 1377 (1927). See, also, Ultra-
mares Corporation v. Touche, Niven, 229 App. Div. 581, 243 N. Y. Supp.
179 (1930).
' Supra Note 5.
108 Me. 498. 81 Atl. 948 (1911).
- Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124, 41 N. E. 414, 29 L. R. A. 360 (1895).
o Supra Note 10.
3' Supra Note 25.
12 Supra Note 26.
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duty of care to one party arising out of a contractual relationship
with another. This comes very close to being an extension of the
principle involved in Lawrence v. Fox.33 By the contract the defen-
dant has assumed the performance of a duty and the relationship of
the plaintiff is such that he may in morals and good conscience rely
upon the defendant to perform that duty properly. 34
The Doyle case raises yet another problem. It would seem that
under its ruling Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.3 5 must go
by the board. If the relationship between the defendant and the
future bondholders was not a trust relationship there can be no
"implied duty or obligation springing from the trust." Will we say
that the Rhinelander case was incorrectly decided or can we find some
other source from which the same legal duty is to be implied? It
might be possible to say that the duty to the bondholders is an implied
term of the contract the intent of which was to create a trust relation-
ship. And yet the majority opinion, after considering a number of
cases on the subject of implied covenants, holds as follows:
"* * * there is nothing in the language of the mortgage
before us to warrant reading into that instrument an implied
covenant, imposing upon the trustee the affirmative obligation,
already discussed, in paying out these bonds or their proceeds."
The problem presented by this case is recommended for a more
extended consideration.
It may be that some of the rulings in the Rhinelander case has
been overruled by Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank.3 6 If so,
the Court of Appeals has corrected two errors made by it in Rhine-
lander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.3 7 Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix
Nat. Bank 38 stands as the law measuring the obligations of cor-
porate trustees.
HENRY WELLING.
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
e' International v. Erie Railroad Co., supra Note 26. In Glanzer v. Shepard
(supra Note 25), Judge Cardozo quotes from Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raymond
909: "It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act even though gratui-
tously may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully if he
acts at all."
Supra Note 24.
Supra Note 30.
Supra Note 24.
Supra Note 30.
